By Helen Lackner
The acute shortage of basic staples, wheat and rice, as well as other basics of Yemeni diet, such as cooking oil, tea and sugar is about to get much worse. Other than some locally produced wheat [less than 10 percent of actual consumption] and other staples like sorghum and maize, the population, rural and urban alike, depends on imports for their very survival.
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Until earlier this year, the Central Bank of Yemen [CBY] was the one institution that functioned with the tacit approval of both sides of the conflict. Given the almost total lack of income from the usual main sources [oil exports and foreign assistance], its reserves shrunk to less than one billion USD by the summer, as it continued to pay the basic salaries of civil servants and military/security staff on both sides in the current war.
Against the advice of most of his international supporters [IMF and World Bank in particular], on September 19, Hadi announced the transfer of CBY headquarters from Sana’a to his regime’s ‘temporary capital’, Aden. The CBY has no funds, its Aden office lacks competent trained staff [who are still in Sana’a or have been dismissed], and prospects of filling its coffers are seriously in doubt given that the move was not approved by funders.
For the people, this has two implications: first the main source of income for over a third of the population has dried up as state salaries have not been paid, despite frequent assertions that distribution of cash will start within days. Staff demonstrate everywhere on a daily basis to demand payment as they simply no longer have money to buy food.
The second and most frightening aspect is that the CBY is now unable to provide the letters of credit or guarantees commercial importers need to purchase food on the international market. Hence, the two to three months food purchase cycle is currently interrupted.
By end January 2017 the food crisis will worsen dramatically. It is likely that, by that time, only food smuggled in from Saudi Arabia and elsewhere will reach the areas under the control of the Saleh/Houthi faction.
The irony of this should not be lost: on the one hand, the Saudi-led coalition is bombing the country AND keeping a tight control [some call it a siege or a blockade] over ships bringing in essential supplies, after having disabled cranes and destroyed other essential communication infrastructure, including bridges and roads.
On the other hand, at the moment, much [and soon most] of the food and fuel supplies arriving in the Houthi/Saleh controlled areas are smuggled mainly from Saudi Arabia and other states involved in the coalition. Some might say that the coalition is ensuring profits for the smugglers at the expense of legitimate commercial companies.
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Diplomatic Efforts
Efforts to solve the crisis and end the war have systematically failed. The Kuwait negotiations mediated by the UN’s special envoy to Yemen, Ismail Ould al Sheikh Ahmed lasted from 21 April to 6 August 2016, achieving nothing.
On 25 August, the US took a leading role with a meeting in Riyadh where US Secretary of State Kerry met with senior officials from Saudi Arabia, the UAE and the UK, thus indicating clearly who the main players are: no Yemenis were involved.
This group now officially known as the quartet, or gang of four, has led attempts at negotiations and is managed in the field by the unfortunate Ismail. Success has been equally elusive, despite serious efforts by Kerry in coordination with Oman, the only GCC state out of the coalition, and seen by most as a welcome neutral force.
Kerry announced a ceasefire to start on 17 November. But this simply failed to materialize. The next one, declared unilaterally by the coalition forces, to last 48 hours starting on 19 November remained completely unnoticeable on the ground, where air strikes continued as before, during and after this non-event. If any negotiations are currently taking place, it is certainly a well-kept secret.
There is no doubt that Ismail is trying to do something, but the extent of his influence is demonstrated by the simple fact that after the end of the Kuwait talks, the Saleh/Houthi delegation remained stuck in Oman for two months.
The UN was unable to fulfil its elementary responsibility of returning the delegation home, as it could not get clearance for a plane to fly to Sana’a, whose airspace is under the control of the Saudi Arabian regime. The Saudis are still keeping Sana’a airport closed.
The likelihood of a solution in the final days of the Obama administration is minimal, regardless of Kerry’s concerns. As for prospects of US policies and involvement under Trump, readers are advised to read "Trump and the Yemen war" by Adam Baron and Peter Salisbury.
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Future Prospects
With military and political stalemates, Yemen’s internal situation is paralyzed. Can the international forces involved make a positive difference? The EU is actively involved in political discussions and also in development and humanitarian work. The UN has demonstrated its weakness. The end of the US administration term is unlikely to achieve much.
The UK is the ‘pen holder’ at the UN Security Council; it has recently systematically failed to submit a new resolution though drafts have circulated. A helpful move would be a resolution able to break the deadlock created by UNSC 2016. This explicitly calls for the restoration of Hadi to power, thus ignoring the reality of a divided country, the real balance of power or, indeed, his discredit.
It should be replaced by a more even-handed resolution, making realistic demands: the exclusion of the major players on both sides from Yemeni politics, including mechanisms for the restoration of peace, and the establishment of a regime that gives a role to all Yemenis.
Instead of concentrating work on its possibly positive role at the UNSC, Britain appears to be more focused on pandering to the GCC states to ensure their continuing contribution to the British economy and finances post-Brexit. This strategy means that exporting arms to the GCC states, particularly Saudi Arabia takes priority over helping to bring peace and a viable state for millions of poor Yemenis.
The judicial review of British arms sales to Saudi Arabia, due in January, may help increase popular awareness. It is unlikely to prevent further arms deals, worth BPD 3.3 billion, officially ‘compensated’ in the government’s view by the increase of humanitarian aid to BPD 100 million, an impressive one percent of the value of the arms sales!
Meanwhile the people continue to be killed and maimed by the bombs. More than 10 000 have been killed this way. In addition, people are dying from starvation: more than seven million are severely undernourished, i.e. starving, while another seven million or more are just undernourished, i.e. hungry.
Food will stop arriving in the country within weeks. So readers are welcome to support the current appeal of Disasters Emergency Committee [DEC], finance MSF which is doing an excellent job providing medical care, or help in other ways they can, or at the very least informing others of the situation.
Keep Yemen, Syria, Libya, Iraq and others in your thoughts at least while you are celebrating!
Source: Open Democracy, Edited by Website Team
